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NOTE
In re Quinlan Revisited: The Judicial Role
in Protecting the Privacy Right of
Dying Incompetents*
Introduction
Twelve years after the New Jersey Supreme Court's landmark In re
Quinlan I decision, the legally and morally perplexing question of who
decides2 whether to forego life sustaining treatment3 for irreversibly in-
* This Note is dedicated in fond remembrance to Professor Paul Ramsey, late professor
emeritus of Christian ethics at Princeton University. Professor Ramsey was a vigorous
champion of the dignity and rights of the vulnerable ill and dying.
1. 70 N.J.10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
2. This Note focuses on the court's role in adjudicating treatment decisions for the irre-
versibly incompetent patient. An ancillary, but equally important issue is whether the problem
of deciding the dying incompetent's treatment is a fundamentally medical or legal dilemma. If
a treatment decision presents essentially a question of medical judgment, some have argued
that the courts generally are not needed to oversee physicians' exercise of medical discretion.
See, eg., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75-76 (1981) (Jones, J., dissenting in
part); see also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984) (in consultation with family members, doctors are in the best position to make these
decisions regarding the termination of treatment for dying incompetents). Under this ap-
proach, a proper member of the patient's family may approve a physician's decision to end
treatment or to forego efforts at resuscitation without formal legal process. Id. See also In re
Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 567, 747 P.2d 445, 456 (1987). Others assert that
only the patient in consultation with her attending physician has the legal right to make signifi-
cant medical decisions. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) (the
doctor's role is to provide the necessary medical facts and the patient's role is to make a
decision regarding treatment based on his understanding of those facts). According to this
view, a surrogate decision-maker must petition the court for permission to terminate treatment
of a dying incompetent patient. For a discussion of the conflicts between these medical and
legal frames of reference, see Note, Decisionmaking for the Incompetent Terminally Ill Patient
A Compromise in a Solution Eliminates A Compromise of Patients' Rights, 57 IND. L.J. 325
(1982). Under either the medical or legal approach courts must ultimately establish "appro-
priate constraints" on this type of decision-making to protect patients' interests in controlling
their own lives. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 345-46, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985). Accord,
Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 N.E.2d 417,
435 (1977) ("Such questions of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but
passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of gov-
ernment was created."). Cf In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied sub nom.
Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). Judge Jones, dissenting in part in Storar, questioned the
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competent; dying patients4 continues to vex and divide the courts. In
Quinlan, the court held that a trustworthy loved one could assert the
patient's constitutional right to privacy to support a request, in the pa-
tient's name, to withdraw life prolonging treatment.5 However, the
court's bold innovation of judicially authorizing a trusted, intimate sur-
rogate to resolve the question unguided by the patient's expressed prefer-
ence remains an insight in search of a rationale. The New York Times
recently observed the medical dilemma underlying the problem when it
noted that medical science has expanded doctors' ability to sustain life
faster than their ability to restore health.6
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the question, several state high courts considering patients whose treat-
presumed superior competence of the judiciary to make decisions to forego or terminate life
support, noting that many such treatment choices were made routinely by doctors and families
without judicial involvement: "The problem [of deciding whether to forego life support] is one
which the judicial system is unsuited and ill-equipped to solve and which should not usually be
made the subject of judicial attention." Id. at 385, 420 N.E.2d at 75. Judge Jones acknowl-
edged, however, that "there will be occasions in which the courts will have [these cases] thrust
on them." Id. at 386, 420 N.E. at 76. Given the inability of the patient himself to direct the
treatment decision in Storar, Judge Jones endorsed deference to the patient's mother, whose
decision appeared consistent with an objective weighing of the medical factors involved. Id at
391, 420 N.E.2d at 79. Private partie& may also bring uncontested matters to court, either to
avoid future liability by obtaining court approval, or to comply with statutory requirements as
guardians of the incompetent. See, eg., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert
denied sub nom Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986) (declaratory judgments sought by close fam-
ily members to establish right to end patient's life sustaining treatment); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (guardian petitioned court for permission to terminate life support).
3. The phrase "foregoing life sustaining treatment" refers to withholding initiation of
such treatment as well as withdrawing treatment once it has commenced. See generally PREsI-
DENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
4. An "incompetent" patient lacks either the mental capacity to understand her medical
condition or the physical capacity to communicate her preferences. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at
360, 486 A.2d at 1229 ("[T]he condition of an incompetent patient makes it impossible to
ascertain definitively his present desires."). Incompetence may result from sudden or gradual
brain damage that leads to coma, permanent loss of consciousness, or severe dementia.
Defining the term "dying" has itself become problematic. The dictionary definition,
"about to die," WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 436 (2d College ed. 1976), clearly
applies when a patient's physical condition is rapidly and irreversibly deteriorating. In other
cases, however, technology may make possible a prolonged period of survival without recov-
ery. In such a situation, physicians and jurists consider the patient to be "dying" not because
death is imminent, but because recovery to a sapient or even sentient state is extremely un-
likely. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 at 1344 (Del. Supr.
1980) ("[W]e are on the threshold of new terrain-the penumbra where death begins but life,
in some form, continues."). For a discussion of the problems that arise because of the vague-
ness of the term "dying", see G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, JR., LIFE AND DEATH wrrH LIBERTY
AND JUSTICE 59-85 (1979) [hereinafter GRisEz & BOYLE].
5. 70 N.J. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at 6.
6. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1986, at 10, col. 5.
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ment preferences are readily ascertainable have adopted Quinlan's reli-
ance on the patient's federal constitutional right to privacy7 to control
her own medical care. Some courts rely additionally or exclusively on
the common law right of self determination8 to assure that the patient
retains control over treatment decisions where the patient's preference is
clear.9 The issues presented in Quinlan, however, differ significantly from
those presented when the incompetent patient has earlier expressed a
clear view regarding such treatment. When the courts cannot determine
the patient's preference, they must rely on the common law doctrine of
parenspatriae 10 to decide in the patient's "best interest" whether to with-
draw life prolonging treatment. Courts frequently diverge in their stan-
dards for defining the patient's "best interest."'" This variance results
from a general lack of legislative guidance in these "no expressed prefer-
ence" cases 12 and the inherently fact-sensitive, equitable nature of such
decisions. 3 Although the "no expressed preference" patient is consist-
ently held to enjoy the same right of self determination as competent
7. Although the Constitution contains no explicit reference to the right to privacy, the
United States Supreme Court has held that certain textual constitutional rights imply this
right. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 109
Wash.2d 545, 554, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398
Mass. 417, 430-31, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633-34 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347-349, 486
A.2d 1209, 1222-23 (1985); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921,
924 (Fla. 1984); In re Torres, 357 N.W. 2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
8. The right of self determination refers to the individual's right to control her own body,
including medical treatment. See infra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
9. See cases cited in note 7, supra See also Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y. 2d 363, 376, 420
N.E. 2d 64, 70 (1981).
10. Literally, "parent of the country." This doctrine provides "that all orphans, depen-
dent children, and incompetent persons, are within the special protection, and under the con-
trol, of the state." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (3d ed. 1969). See infra note 34 and
accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
12. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1220-21; In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 821-22,
689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1014, 195
Cal.Rptr. 484, 488-89 (1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980) (calling for
legislative guidance in the management of treatment termination decisions for dying incompe-
tent patients). While state legislatures have at times explicitly provided procedures by which
incompetent adults may clarify their treatment preferences under the circumstances of dying
incompetency, such statutes often do not explicitly cover the case of the "no expressed prefer-
ence" patient, see Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 564-65, 747 P. 2d at 455 (majority's view) and id. at
575-80, 747 P.2d 460-63 (Goodloe, J., dissenting) (dissent's view). See also infra note 17.
For convenience, the term "no expressed preference" refers to dying incompetent patients
who, prior to their incompetency, had not clearly and reliably expressed their preference on
the question of whether life sustaining treatment should be withheld.
13. At least one court has openly expressed its apprehension in dealing with this highly
sensitive issue: "We thus approach this case with caution, conscious that life-and-death deci-
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patients and patients who have made their views clear, use of the "best
interest" method of surrogate decision-making may result in a decision
contrary to the patient's wishes.14 When the court disregards compelling
but evidentially defective indications of the patient's wishes, the best in-
terest test may eliminate any personal influence by the patient on the
decision to terminate treatment. 15
This Note argues that the dilemma faced by courts charged with
upholding the common law doctrines of both self determination and
parenspatriae can be resolved in some cases by a privacy right rationale.
Expanding on Quinlan, the Note offers a more developed analysis of the
applicability of the privacy right to this policy conflict. Part I examines
the courts' reliance on the common law doctrines of self determination
and parens patriae to decide medical treatment questions. Part II ex-
plores the Quinlan case and relates the constitutional right to privacy to
the circumstances of "no expressed preference" patients who have a
trustworthy intimate to serve as surrogate decision-maker. Part III ap-
plies this privacy right rationale to two recent cases in which courts em-
ployed different types of best interest tests on behalf of "no expressed
preference" patients. This Note concludes that neither the common law
right of self determination nor a best interest test adequately protects the
dying incompetent's privacy interest when the patient has not previously
expressed a clear preference as to treatment decisions. It advocates in-
stead the sound and humane policy advanced by the ruling in Quinlan,
which favors putting the decision in the hands of a trustworthy intimate
of the dying incompetent. The court's use of the privacy right in Quinlan
did not merely provide constitutional stature to the right of self determi-
nation; it expanded the law's protection of a patient's privacy beyond
that offered by the self determination right.
I. Common Law Background
The question whether to forego life support arises when a patient
lacks the competence to understand and evaluate her condition and to
decide whether to continue noncurative, life prolonging treatment. 16 In
sions like these are an awesome responsibility that can be undertaken only with a profound
sense of humility and reserve." Conroy, 98 N.J. at 343-44, 486 A.2d at 1220.
14. See infra text accompanying and following notes 50-51.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 52-57.
16. Some commentators reject this question from the outset, asserting that the state inter-
est in preserving life should control in all situations where the patient herself does not explic-
itly and competently refuse the life sustaining treatment. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. N.
YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1986) 720-21 [hereinafter NOWAK, ROTUNDA, &
YOUNG]. This view has been criticized for several reasons. First, competent patients, con-
fronted with expensive, often painful life support without hope of recovery, have increasingly
elected to forego life support, calling into question the accuracy of the legal presumption that
the incompetent patient, if competent, would favor continued treatment. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, supra note 3 at 240. Second, the common law right of competent patients to control
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these cases someone other than the patient must decide whether to forego
treatment. The method chosen for surrogate decision-making depends
on whether the patient has expressed a clear preference prior to becom-
ing incompetent.
Three different scenarios arise in which a patient must rely on a
surrogate. First, the dying patient, during an earlier period of compe-
tency, may have clearly and reliably expressed a preference as to whether
she would wish physicians to continue artificial life support in the event
of her incompetency. 17 Second, dying infants or mentally retarded per-
sons always require surrogate decision-makers because courts deem these
persons incompetent even before the onset of physical disability."8 Third,
their medical treatment, even if their choice hastens death from their disease, has been
strengthened by increased legislative action and judicial confirmation. See Note, PROXY DECI-
SIONMAKING FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL: THE VIRGINIA APPROACH, 70 VA. L. REv. 1269
(1984). This recent policymaking suggests a shift away'from a presumption that a dying pa-
tient necessarily prefers to sustain life at any cost. See GRISEZ AND BOYLE, supra note 4, at
269-70 ("If a noncompetent person is dying and permanently unconscious, then the reasonable
presumption is that the medical care to prolong life is innapropriate, since most people would
find care under such conditions psychologically repugnant and inconsiderate of others.").
Third, the courts generally apply an analysis based on the choices of competent patients to the
circumstances of dying incompetent patients, especially where an incompetent patient has ex-
pressed a clear preference on the life support question. See, eg., cases cited in note 7, supra.
17. See, eg., Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y. 2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981) (patient's prefer-
ence should control where the patient, having fallen into an irreversible coma, had earlier
clearly expressed the desire that life support be ended if his condition indicated no chance of
recovery). A "living will," "a physician's directive" under a "natural death" statute, and a
"durable power of attorney for health care" provide different degrees of statutory authority for
enforcing the patient's preferences expressed in such documents. A living will is an "instru-
ment executed with the formalities necessary for a valid will, expressing an intention to refuse
treatment and release medical personnel from all liability should the declarant become termi-
nally ill and incapable of asserting the right to refuse treatment. Ufford, Brain
Death/Termination of Heroic Efforts to Save Life-Who Decides?, 19 Washburn L.J. 225, 247
(1980). Living wills are generally not legally enforceable without enabling legislation. Note,
The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L.
REv. 913, 917 (1979).
Natural death acts provide a statutory form by which a patient directs his physicians to
forego artificial life support under certain circumstances without civil or criminal liability.
See, eg., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988). For a discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of a natural death act which also provides for living wills, see Note,
Proxy Decisionmaking, supra 1272-1302. A durable power of attorney for health cases is a
statutory form authorizing a patient's agent, as "attorney in fact," to make health care deci-
sions for the patient as principal, under certain circumstances, after the patient has become
incompetent. See, eg., Cal. Civil Code §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1988). Because these de-
vices are either absent or ineffective in the case of the patient who has expressed no clear
preference, they are not extensively considered in this Note. Although these documents often
have limited statutory authority to control the treatment decision, they may have evidentiary
significance in court proceedings where the court seeks to determine the patient's preferences.
See, eg., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 361-63, 486 A.2d at 1229-31.
18. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380, 420 N.E.2d 64 (mentally retarded 52-year-old patient);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass., 728, 749-51, 370 N.E.2d,
417, 427-29 (1977) (mentally retarded 67-year-old patient).
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a formerly competent patient may have expressed no treatment prefer-
ence at all, or she may have offered expressions of doubtful reliability or
applicability to her present medical condition.19 This Note focuses on
the third class of incompetent patients.
A. The Right of Self Determination and Substitute Judgment
At common law, a competent person's right of self determination
gives her essentially unrestricted authority to limit others' contact with
her body.2" The doctrine encompasses a patient's right to refuse medical
treatment even when such refusal is life threatening.2 It is especially
strong against countervailing interests22 when the refusal is by a dying
patient and relates to medical treatment that cannot restore the patient's
health.23
Since the right of self determination can only be exercised by a per-
son competent to evaluate her condition, a patient lacking this capacity
forfeits her right of self determination unless the surrogate decision-
maker, standing in the place of the incompetent, asserts the patient's
preference.24 This surrogate decision-making is embodied in the doctrine
of substitute judgment.25 Courts will rely on the substitute judgment
doctrine only when the surrogate decision-maker demonstrates the in-
competent person's preferences with reasonable certainty.26 When the
19. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 339-40, 486 A.2d 1209 (patient had expressed no prefer-
ence, but feared doctors and had refused to see one when she contracted pneumonia); Quinlan,
70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (patient had left several statements of little probative value).
20. In In re Conroy the court noted, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestion-
able authority of law . . ., 'The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete
immunity: to be let alone.'" 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221-22 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing to compel personal injury plaintiff to undergo
pretrial medical examination)).
21. Id. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225.
22. These interests include the state's interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, pro-
tecting innocent third parties, and maintaining the integrity of the medical profession. Conroy,
98 N.J. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at 1223.
23. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
24. See Note, supra note 16, at 1296-97.
25. For a useful summary of the substitute judgment rule, see Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saickewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 751-52, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977).
26. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-61, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985); In re Colyer,
99 Wash. 2d 114, 125, 660 P.2d 738, 745 (1983); Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y. 2d 363, 377, 420
N.E. 2d 64, 71 (1981). But cf. Saickewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370 N.E. 2d 417,431 (1977),
where the court held that "the [treatment] decision in cases such as this [of a mentally retarded
patient] should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were
competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as
one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the com-
petent person." The court opined that this decision-making formula is not inconsistent with
the use of the substituted judgment doctrine:
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patient expresses a treatment preference prior to her loss of competence,
the court views the surrogate as merely supplying the capacity to enforce
the incompetent's choice. Thus, a dying patient's right of self determina-
tion outweighs the rights of the patient's family, physician, or other care
provider to base a treatment determination on their individual interests
or ethical imperatives.27 The irreversible incompetent's right of self de-
termination also outweighs the state's interest in preserving life, prevent-
ing suicide, protecting third party dependents of the dying patient, and
preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession.28
The crucial trigger for the exercise of substitute judgment is a deter-
mination of what the incompetent's choice would be if she were compe-
tent. In the relatively few cases where the patient's preference is clear,
substitute judgment is the proper surrogation method.29 When a court
cannot determine a patient's preference, strict application of the substi-
Joseph Saickewicz [the patient] was profoundly retarded and noncommunicative his
entire life.... While it may thus be necessary to rely to a greater degree on objective
criteria, such as the supposed inability of profoundly retarded persons to conceptual-
ize or fear death, the effort to bring the substituted judgment into step with the values
and desires of the affected individual must not be abandoned.
Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E. 2d 430-31.
27. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350-53, 486 A.2d at 1223-25;
28. Id.
29. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 427, 430-33, 497 N.E. 2d 626,
631, 633-35, (1986); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 752-59, 370 N.E.2d at 431-35; Eichner v. Dillon,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (1981). The Conroy court also developed a subjective
test for elderly, incompetent, severely impaired nursing home residents with a life expectancy
of a year or less. Based on the substitute judgment rule, this test would allow the foregoing of
life support "when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused the treatment
under the circumstances involved," 98 N.J. at 360-64, 486 A.2d at 1229-31.
For two examples of the use of substitute judgment to assert the right of self determinaion
for incompetent patients who have left a clearly expressed preference, see Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981), and Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). In Eichner,
Brother Fox, an 83-year-old member of a Catholic religious order, suffered severe brain dam-
age during surgery and fell into an irreversible "vegetative coma." Id. at 371, 420 N.E. 2d at
67. The court found that Father Eichner, Brother Fox's religious superior, demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that Brother Fox had expressed a desire that treatment be with-
drawn from him under such circumstances.
After quoting Justice Cardozo ("[every person] of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what should be done with his own body," Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d
at 70 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914))), the court found that neither the state's interest in protecting the lives of its citizens
nor a doctor's obligation to provide medical care outweighs "the right of the competent adult
to make his own decision [regarding a cessation of life support]." Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 377,
420 N.E.2d at 71. The court rejected the district attorney's arguments that any right the
patient may have is entirely personal and not open to exercise by any third party, and that a
substitute judgment would deprive the patient of his fourteenth amendment right to life. Id. at
377, 420 N.E. 2d at 71. Since Brother Fox had made the decision for himself before he became
incompetent, id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, the court concluded that the surrogate would
"give effect to [Brother Fox's] right by carrying out his stated intentions." Id. at 379-80, 420
N.E.2d at 72. The court stressed the importance of clear and convincing evidence matching
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tute judgment doctrine becomes impossible. In such a case, allowing a
surrogate to substitute her judgment for that of the patient would result
in the surrogate's supplying the content of the incompetent's choice,
rather than merely implementing that choice.3" This clearly violates the
principles underlying the use of substitute judgment to effectuate a pa-
tient's right of self determination.31 Thus, courts do not normally rely on
a surrogate to supply a treatment decision for a patient who has not pre-
viously expressed a clear preference on the issue.32
B. The "Best Interest" Test and Parens Patriae
When the dying incompetent has not previously expressed a clear
and reliable preference regarding treatment, a court must determine
whether withdrawal of life support systems serves the patient's "best in-
terests."33 The court derives its authority to render decisions from the
the surrogate's decision to the patient's serious and reliable expression of his preference. Id. at
379-80, 420 N.E. 2d at 72.
In Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986), an irreversibly comatose patient had
expressed to his wife on numerous occasions over several years a strong preference against
receiving life support treatment if he should become irreversibly comatose. Id. at 427, 497
N.E.2d at 631. The probate court nonetheless refused to allow the patient's preference to
control the treatment decision. Life support involved a plastic "G-tube", a simple,
nonmechanical device that used gravity to pass food and water directly into the patient's stom-
ach. Id. at 427, 497 N.E.2d at 630. The probate court found that the G-tube was not "painful,
uncomfortable, burdensome, unusual, hazardous, invasive or intrusive, even in relation to a
conscious patient," id. at 426, 497 N.E.2d at 631, and that patients had lived relatively com-
fortably for up to thirty-seven years on the G-tube. Id. at 437, 497 N.E.2d at 637. Because
"death by dehydration is extremely painful and uncomfortable," it could not "be ruled out"
that Brophy might experience a painful death if the G-tube were removed. Id. at 426 n.20, 497
N.E.2d at 631 n. 20. The probate court thus concluded that the patient's best interests re-
quired that life support continue despite the patient's preference. Id. at 422, 497 N.E.2d at
628-29 n.5.
Reversing this holding as "paternalistic," id. at 431, 497 N.E.2d at 633, the Massachus-
setts high court held that the patient's right of self determination should control. Id. at 430,
497 N.E.2d. at 633. Despite the relatively nonintrusive effect of the G-tube, the high court
found that the other requirements to keep Mr. Brophy alive were intrusive as a matter of law,
triggering his right to refuse treatment.
30. In Saikewicz the Massachussetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that a men-
tally retarded patient "had no capacity to understand his present situation or his prognosis."
373 Mass. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430. The court nonetheless applied the substituted judgment
rule. Id. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31. See supra note 26.
31. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231.
32. The New Jersey Supreme Court applied a strained version of substitute judgment by
allowing the patient's father to decide the treatment issue despite his inability to demonstrate
how his daughter would have decided if she had been competent. Quinlan 70 N.J. at 41-42,
355 A.2d at 664. See infra notes 107-76 and accompanying text.
33. The key question for such court-controlled decisions is whether evidence of patient
values goes only to show clear and reliable patient preference on the treatment question suffi-
cient to trigger the patient's right of self determination and an exercise of substitute judgment,
or whether such evidence, even though inconclusive, might influence the court's criteria in
applying the best interest test. Under a Conroy-type best interest test, see infra notes 4347, 52-
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common law duty to protect the vulnerable and helpless. Under the doc-
trine of parens patriae,34 the court must protect those who are incapable
of exercising their own rights.
In addition to serving as the incompetent's advocate under the
parens patriae doctrine, the court must also enforce state policies that
favor prolonging life.35 Neither statutory law nor common law defines
the balance of these state interests relative to the rights of dying incompe-
tents who have expressed no clear preference. 36 The courts must thus
perform in two potentially conflicting roles. On the one hand the court
must advocate the interests of the incompetent who did not express a
treatment preference but who may nonetheless wish to discontinue treat-
ment. On the other hand the court must support the state's frequently
unclear policies to "protect" dying incompetents from a third party's de-
cision to end life support. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising
that courts experience difficulty in interpreting the law 37 and may be ac-
cused of judicial legislation.38
Whether the judge functions as interpreter of the law or as legisla-
tor, the lack of a patient's expressed preference necessitates court-defined
criteria for making a treatment decision.39 One approach considers the
treatment question "objectively", focusing primarily or exclusively on
the patient's medical condition and likelihood of experiencing physical
56 and accompanying text, evidence would preclude application of the patient's right of self
determination, and the public policy favoring maintenance of life support would control. 98
N.J. at 967-68, 486 A.2d at 1233. This imposition of the state's preference could eliminate the
possibility of ending life support, even if the termination of treatment were a reasonable alter-
native based on the patient's values. In short, this means that in protecting the unexpressed
right of the dying incompetent, the court gives its own content to that right and refuses to
defer to the patient, even when some reliable evidence indicates that the state view dishonors
the patient it stands bound to protect. Id. at 385-86, 486 A.2d at 1242-43.
34. See supra note 10. "This [doctrine] permits the state to authorize guardians to [with-
draw life support] from an incompetent patient if it is manifest that such action would further
the patient's best interests in a narrow sense of the phrase, even though the subjective test...
may not be satisfied." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1231.
35. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 345, 486 A.2d at 1233.
36. Regarding statutory law, the Conroy court acknowledged that "neither [of two New
Jersey statutes concerning the rights of the institutionalized elderly] provides specific guide-
lines concerning termination of life-sustaining treatment." Conroy, 98 N.J at 345,486 A.2d at
1221. While policy seems difficult to discern on the part of the courts, the Conroy court noted,
"Everyday, and with limited legal guidance, families and doctors are making decisions for
patients like Claire Conroy." Id. Courts are thus required to develop policy guidelines in this
area. Id.
37. See supra, notes 13, 17, and 36.
38. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 575, 747 P.2d 445, 460
(1987) (Andersen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am not convinced that the
members of this court and the lawyers before it have a better ability to understand and decide
the underlying issue of very basic public policy than have the electorate or their elected repre-
sentatives in the Legislature .... I consider the Legislature to be the preferred body to deal
with this issue and would defer to it.").
39. See supra notes 2, 36 and 32. See also infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
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suffering.' Under the objective approach, the court will presume that
the reasonable, competent patient suffering from certain medical condi-
tions would choose to discontinue treatment.41 A second approach in-
volves the determination of the patient's probable subjective desires.42
The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy43 suggested two
types of objective best interest tests. First, the court described a "limited-
objective test" that would allow termination of life support when there is
"some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused treat-
ment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens
of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of
that life for him."" Second, the court proposed a "pure-objective test" to
be applied when there is no trustworthy evidence of a patient's prefer-
ence.45  As in the limited objective test, the surrogate decision-maker
seeking to end life support must first demonstrate that the burdens on the
patient as a result of treatment "markedly outweigh" the benefits of life
with the treatment.46 A court would authorize termination of life sus-
taining treatment under the pure objective test only if a second test is also
met: "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with
the treatment [is] such that the effect of administering life sustaining
treatment would be inhumane."'47
In contrast to the objective tests proposed by the court in Conroy,
the report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
40. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232 ("limited-objective" and "pure-
objective" best interest tests focusing primarily on balancing the benefits and burdens of living
with treatment under specific medical circumstances).
41. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
42. Two courts have adopted best interest tests emphasizing a patient's values as well as
her medical condition. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431; Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1983). Because of the subjective quality of
these tests, however, "best interests tests" is a misnomer. They are better described as "patient
values" tests, or "loose" substitute judgments. See infra text at p. 18 and note 103 and accom-
panying text.
43. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
44. 98 N.J. at 967-68, 486 A.2d at 1232 (emphasis added). The court defines the "bur-
dens" to be considered strictly in terms of physical suffering, while the "benefits" may include
"any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the patient may
still be able to derive from life." Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. Because the dying incompetent
patient's cognitive abilities are frequently either ended or severely impaired, both "benefits"
and "burdens" of these "objective tests" refer, in effect to physical conditions, as observed by
one dissenter: "While the basic standard [in the objective tests] purports to account for several
concerns, it ultimately focuses on pain as the critical factor. The presence of significant pain in
effect becomes the sole measure of such a person's [like Ms. Conroy] best interests. 'Pain' thus
eclipses a whole cluster of other human values that have a proper place in the subtle weighing
that will ultimately determine how life should end." Id. at 394, 486 A.2d at 1247 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 967-68, 486 A.2d at 1232.
46. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
47. Id. at 967-68, 486 A.2d at 1232.
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Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behaviorial Research48 advo-
cated a best interest test that focuses on the patient's likely subjective
wishes. Under this broad best interest test, a surrogate would draw upon
his and others' intimate familiarity with the patient to determine the pa-
tient's likely values and desires in relation to the treatment decision.
These values would be related to the patient's medical condition and
level of pain. 9 This subjective test avoids the danger of automatically
imposing on the dying incompetent a presumption that her best interests
should be defined according to a public policy favoring prolongation of
life support.
C. The Limits of the Common Law
The common law doctrines of self determination and parens patriae
inadequately protect the privacy interest of patients who have expressed
no clear preference regarding treatment. The policy underlying the right
of self determination does not distinguish competent from incompetent
patients;50 the right can be asserted, however, only by a currently compe-
tent patient or by an incompetent patient who expressed a clear prefer-
ence while competent. 1 Since a patient with "no expressed preference"
fits neither of these categories, he cannot avail himself of the protections
available under the doctrine of self determination.
The parens patriae doctrine is equally unavailing in this context.
Both the limited and the pure-objective best interest tests suggested by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy define the patient's best inter-
ests according to judicially established criteria as distinct from the pa-
tient's values. Under Conroy, a "no expressed preference" patient who
actually prefers to discontinue artificial life support but whose continued
existence does not involve "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain," will
be kept alive against her will.52 Under the first prong of the Conroy lim-
ited-objective test, which looks for "some trustworthy evidence that the
patient would have refused treatment,"53 the court may consider the pa-
tient's values as "some trustworthy evidence" of the patient's preference
to end life support. Applying the second prong, however, the court
would emasculate the influence of any such consideration; while the pa-
tient's implied measure of the burdens and benefits of life support, as
indicated by the "trustworthy evidence," would argue against continued
48. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note3, at 135.
49. Id. at 136. For a judicial application of this test, see Barber v. Superior Court, 147
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1983), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 143-
161.
50. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
51. See Eichner, 52 N.Y. 2d at 379-80, 420 N.E. at 72 (clear and convincing evidence of
patient's preferences needed to forego life support in patient's name).
52. 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
53. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 967-68, 486 A.2d at 1232.
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treatment, the court's focus on a physical benefits/burdens calculus
would control the decision. The patient's values thus do not affect the
weighing of the benefits and burdens; they merely preclude the court
from imposing the pure-objective test's additional criterion that the pa-
tient must be suffering "recurrent, unavoidable and severe pain." The
patient's values make possible a decision based on a test which is rela-
tively easier to meet than the pure-objective test, but still completely
court defined according to objective criteria, and still quite severe.54
For example, suppose a vegetative patient kept alive by a simple
feeding tube55 had left only "some trustworthy evidence" that he consid-
ered the humiliation of helplessness and constant handling to be a com-
pelling reason not to continue treatment, even assuming his life could be
maintained with little or no discomfort. Under the Conrov limited-objec-
tive test, the court would be unable to order termination of life support
since neither the feeding tube nor physical handling produces physical
pain sufficient to "markedly outweigh any physical pleasure, emotional
enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the patient may still be able to
derive from life." 56 In such a case application of theparenspatriae doc-
trine through the best interest test would contradict the goal of the policy
behind the right of self determination. An opportunity to enable a pa-
tient to influence his own treatment decision would be disregarded in
favor of the court's perception of the "objective" preconditions needed to
end life support. By assuming against the evidence that the patient pre-
fers to prolong his life, the court entirely ignores the patient's own values.
Among the various common law tests available to courts consider-
ing treatment alternatives, only the subjective best interest test assures
some patient influence over the treatment decision. But because the sub-
jective test injects a patient's preference into the judicial determination,
the test actually falls outside the scope of the parens patriae doctrine.
Under its obligation as parens patrie, the court normally undertakes an
active role as guardian of those individuals who suffer from some legal
disability. In the case of a dying patient, the court stands in the place of
the incompetent to protect his rights. In contrast, the court's essential
duty under the "subjective" best interest test proposed by the President's
54. See supra note 44.
55. This type of tube was the life support at issue in Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E. 2d
626. See supra note 29.
56. 98 N.J. at 967-68, 486 A.2d. at 1232. Under the circumstances suggested in this ex-
ample the Conroy test may very likely encourage perjury. A loved one may be unable to
produce sufficient evidence to establish a clear preference by the patient, although years of
intimate sensitivity to the patient's attitudes, conduct and beliefs make the patient's decision
clear in the mind of the loved one. Fearful of the results of the Conroy best interest test, an
intimate might fabricate the evidence necessary to keep the decision under his control. Given
the privacy of such communications generally, and the absence of contrary evidence of the
patient's intent, the court would be hard pressed to discover the pejury without some obvious
misstatement by the witness.
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Commission is to surrender representation of the patient's interests to a
surrogate. Using this test, the judge does not apply her own best interest
test, but defers to the surrogate, who formulates and applies the test
based on the patient's values, virtually without judicial supervision. 7 To
describe this form of judicial abstention as an exercise of its role as pro-
tector of the incompetent strains the parens patriae doctrine. Judicial
inaction in the case of the dying incompetent is tantamount to judicial
deference to the patient's privacy right. Use of the subjective best inter-
est test indicates judicial recognition that both traditional tools of the
common law-the right of self determination and the judiciary's parens
patriae duty to stand in the incompetent's place to protect her interests-
cannot enable the court to decide responsibly for the patient who has
expressed no clear preference.
II. The Right to Privacy and Dying Incompetents
Since both common law doctrines of self determination and parens
patriae fail to protect the rights of patients who have expressed no treat-
ment preference, the courts should adopt a privacy right rationale consis-
tent with the twin goals of the common law-to assure maxumum
patient influence on the treatment decision and to protect the patient
from a decision against her best interest. A sound privacy right analysis
must first address the evidentiary dilemma of assessing a patient's prefer-
ence when the patient has not clearly indicated her wishes; second, it
must ensure maximum patient influence over the surrogate decision; and
third, it must clarify the court's role in promoting a surrogate decision-
making process that most closely resembles the patient's own decision-
making process and is most likely to produce a result in accord with the
patient's wishes.
A. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
In 1965 the United States Supreme Court first described the consti-
tutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.58 In Griswold, the
Court found that a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contracep-
tives impermissibly violated the privacy of the marriage relationship.5 9
Acknowledging that the Constitution contained no explicit reference to a
right of privacy, the Court nonetheless reasoned that a "penumbra" of
privacy rights emanating from certain amendments to the Bill of Rights'
57. See infra notes 143-161 and accompanying text.
58. 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 485-86. Justice Douglas reviewed Supreme Court cases in which the court held
that the Constitution protects the following rights: the right to educate a child in a school of
the parents' choice, the right to study a particular subject or foreign language, the rights to
distribute, receive and read literature, rights of association, expression and belief, and rights of
"privacy and repose." Id. at 482-85.
60. Id. at 484.
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creates a "zone of privacy" within which certain intimate choices are
immune from governmental interference.6 According to the Court,
without this "zone of privacy," the constitutionally explicit protections
of these amendments would be undermined.62Because the Court deemed
"fundamental" the right of a married couple to make procreative deci-
sions, it would allow state action in this area only when the government
could demonstrate a compelling interest.63 The statute at issue in Gris-
wold did not meet this burden.
The Court's use of this "penumbra" theory evoked sharp criticism.
Justice Black, in dissent, rejected the idea of giving constitutional stature
to a "right of privacy," in part because of the vagueness of the term. He
warned that reliance on the privacy right as a "comprehensive substitute
for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against 'unreasonable searches
and seizures'" would distort the scope of explicit constitutional rights:
"'[P]rivacy' is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily
be shrunken in meaning but which can also... easily be interpreted as a
constitutional ban against many things other than searches and
seizures."' Justice Stewart also declined to accept the "penumbra" the-
ory stating that he could find "no such general right of privacy in the Bill
of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before
decided by this Court."65 Numerous commentators have also criticized
the Court's analysis. 6 Although these criticisms suggest flaws in the def-
inition and scope of the privacy right and in the logic linking the privacy
right to explicit constitutional protections, the status of the right as "fun-
damental" is now firmly entrenched in our constitutional law.67
61. Id. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments. A plurality of the Court found that certain "zones of privacy" created by
the "emanations from those [Bill of Rights] guarantees ... help give [these Amendments] life
and substance." Id. at 484.
62. Id. at 481-82.
63. Id. at 509.
64. Id. at 530.
65. See, e.g., Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424-27 (1974)
(The Court has not clarified the "touchstone for determining 'fundamentality'" nor "why
Privacy satisfies that test" in the case of some but not other areas of individual choice); GRISEz
& BOYLE, supra note 4, at 55 (Under the Supreme Court's rationale "[n]o one can say what
the right of privacy might embrace, except in the conclusion of an argument showing what
liberties ought to be respected more than others or in the conclusion of an argument showing
what the Supreme Court is likely to decide"); see also Posner, The Uncertain Protection of
Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 199 (1979) for a criticism of the
Supreme Court's expansion of the privacy right in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(what is private is "simply what the Court thinks should
not be subject to public control").
66. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See also NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND
YOUNG, supra note 16, at 684-85.
67. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Although the Griswold Court did not clearly define "privacy", the
Court since Griswold has expanded the concept to protect unmarried in-
dividuals' procreative rights68 and a woman's right to terminate a preg-
nancy under certain circumstances.69 The Supreme Court has not yet
considered a case in which a surrogate seeks to invoke a dying incompe-
tent's privacy right to withdraw life support treatment. 70 However, sev-
eral state high courts have relied on the patient's privacy right in such
cases, 7 beginning with the New Jersey Supreme Court's landmark In re
Quinlan decision.
B. Quinlan's Use of the Privacy Right
In 1976, twenty-two-year-old Karen Ann Quinlan fell into a coma
after suffering brain damage of unknown origin.72 Her doctors described
her condition as a "persistent vegetative state."7 3 Karen's father peti-
tioned the trial court to appoint him as Karen's guardian and specifically
requested authority to disconnect a respirator that the doctors believed
necessary for her survival.74 The court denied Mr. Quinlan's petition
after finding that statements made earlier by Karen did not indicate relia-
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"[This] Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of cer-
tain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.... Only personal
rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit' in the concept of ordered lib-
erty. ... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.... [The privacy] right
has some extension to activities relating to marriage,... procreation .... contracep-
tion, . . . family relationships, . . . and child rearing and education."
Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
69. In his concurrence in Roe v. Wade, Justice Douglas, author of the plurality opinion in
Griswold, suggested that the zone of privacy encompasses the "freedom to care for one's health
and person [and] freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion." Id. at 213 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
70. See supra note 7.
71. 70 N.J. at 23, 355 A.2d at 654.
72. At the hearing, a medical expert described a subject in this state as one "who remains
with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but who ... no
longer has any cognitive function." Id. The "vegetative" functions control body temperature,
breathing, chewing, swallowing, sleeping and waking, and, to some degree, blood pressure and
heart rate. They are distinguished from the "sapient" function, which controls one's relations
with the outside world and skills such as the cognitive tasks of talking and thinking. Id. at 24,
355 A.2d at 654.
73. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
74. The trial court had refused to admit into evidence Karen's prior statements which
indicated
distaste for continuance of life by extraordinary medical procedures, under circum-
stances not unlike those of the present case. These quoted statements were made in
the context of several conversations with regard to others terminally ill and being
subjected to like heroic measures. The statements were advanced as evidence of what
she would want done in such a contingency as now exists... [i.e.,] not to have her
life prolonged by the otherwise futile use of extraordinary means .... [We agree
with the conception of the trial court that such statements, since they were remote
and impersonal, lacked significant probative weight.
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bly what Karen's preference might be on the treatment question. 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court and granted
Mr. Quinlan's petition.76 The court explained:
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive,
vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a
valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then
it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition
prevents her conscious exercise of the choice. The only practical
way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian
and family of Karen to render their best judgment, subject to [con-
sultation with attending physicians and a hospital ethics commit-
tee] as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances. If
their conclusion is in the, affirmative this decision should be ac-
cepted by a society the overwhelming majority of whose members
would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in
the same way for themselves or for those closest to them. It is for
this reason that we determine that Karen's right of privacy may be
asserted in her behalf, in this respect, by her guardian and family
under the particular circumstances presented by this record."
Thus, the court held that Karen's privacy right provided the legal basis
for her father to assert Karen's presumed desire to discontinue her life
support treatment. The court effectively authorized Karen's surrogate,
her father, to participate in constructing, not merely implementing, his
daughter's decision to withdraw life support.
Despite the novelty of its decision, the court failed to define the pri-
vacy right or explain its relationship to the right of self determination. In
relying on a privacy right analysis, the court extended the boundaries of
Karen's control over the treatment decision beyond her common law
right to reject intrusive bodily contact.78 The court determined that
Karen's right to privacy persisted despite her incompetency and out-
weighed both the state's interest in preserving life and her father's inter-
est in acting as a parent for his daughter's benefit. In effect, the privacy
right protected Karen from imposed decision-making "for" her in such a
way that no action could be taken at all without some judicially-fash-
ioned relief. Since the court found that inaction would equally violate
Id. -at 21-22, 355 A.2d at 653. The Supreme Court later asserted: "[W]e cannot discern
[Karen's] supposed choice based on the testimony of her previous conversations with friends,
where such testimony is without sufficient probative weight." Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
75. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
76. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. The opinion has been widely criticized for its "legisla-
tive" thrust and dubious reasoning. See, e.g. P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE, 268-
99 (1979); GRISEZ & BOYLE, supra note 4, at 283-87.
77. GRISEZ & BOYLE, supra, note 4, at 98 (the Quinlan court should have based its deci-
sion on the "familiar and long-standing common law right of bodily integrity").
78. A "true" substitute judgment would occur only if the surrogate merely implemented a
choice earlier asserted by Karen. See supra notes 42a-75 and accompanying text.
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her privacy right, it allowed a kind of quasi-substitute judgment 79 by per-
mitting Karen's father to exercise her right to control the course of treat-
ment. Thus, Mr. Quinlan acted not from his position as a parent but as
Karen's intimate, one the court could trust to implement Karen's own
decision. This was apparently the best the court believed it could do to
honor Karen's privacy." The solution clearly violated the strict substi-
tute judgment rule because Karen had left no expression of her prefer-
ence on the treatment question. 1
Two conclusions can be drawn from the court's view of the privacy
right: first, the privacy right can in some circumstances limit the court's
parens patriae control over the treatment decision; and second, the right
to privacy and the right of self determination, although related, do not
offer identical protection. Although the Quinlan does not explore this
aspect of its holding, one's right to privacy under Quinlan provides sig-
nificant additional protection not available under the right of self
determination.
1. The Right to Privacy and Parens Patriae
The New Jersey Supreme Court initially cited United States
Supreme Court cases 2 as prohibiting "judicial intrusion into many as-
pects of personal decision,"" and stated that the right to privacy
"[p]resumably [would] encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances."8 4 This language suggests that
the court believed the treatment decision was sufficiently private that it
should not involve itself with the considerations by which Karen, if com-
petent, might arrive at a decision to terminate treatment. The court did
not consider Karen's incompetence a reason to require court involvement
in the construction of a treatment decision in Karen's name. Karen's
father failed to demonstrate that Karen had previously expressed an
opinion on treatment alternatives in these circumstances; nonetheless,
the court allowed Mr. Quinlan to decide whether or not to withdraw
artificial life support. The court did not indicate a need to protect Karen
from the possibility that her father might make a decision contrary to
Karen's actual desires.
79. Indeed, the court held that Karen's right of privacy outweighed any rights Mr. Quin-
lan possessed as a father, 70 N.J. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653.
80. See supra note 74.
81. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
82. The court cited Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The court also cited the privacy right provision of the New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, par. 1.
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
83. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
84. The court noted, "(No physician risked the opinion that she could live more than a
year and indeed she may die much earlier." 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655.
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Apparently, the court believed the right to privacy established a
zone of privacy within which a patient with "no expressed preference"
could control her health care decisions. Honoring this zone of privacy
required the court to protect Karen from its own assertion of an imputed
preference under the parens patriae rule. The court elected to leave the
difficult task of balancing Karen's values and interests in the more relia-
ble hands of her father.
Another consideration supports the court's belief that its obligation
under the parens patriae doctrine was of limited value in resolving the
treatment dilemma. The area of privacy at issue in Quinlan was specific
and uniquely personal: a dying individual's decision to maintain or ter-
minate arguably useless medical care.85 The common law right of self
determination implicitly assures a competent patient a zone of privacy in
this context, suggesting that the decision-making process is itself beyond
the purview of the court. Because the patient's considerations in arriving
at a treatment decision are inherently personal, submitting such consid-
erations to the depersonalizing process of public adjudication destroys
the privacy to which these patients are entitled.
Were she competent to evaluate her circumstances, Karen would
likely weigh together her fears, memories, struggles, and challenges, ulti-
mately arriving at a resolution to the treatment problem. This intensely
personal process, based on Karen's exploration of values and perceptions
personal to her, would be protected from judicial intervention by the
right of self determination.86 Although the common law thus acknowl-
edges and protects the relevance of these personal features of the deci-
sion-making process, their subtle interrelations and inherently personal
nature would be lost if subjected to a public adjudicatory process. Simi-
larly, judicial involvement directed toward imputing a preference to
Karen based on strictly objective criteria would preclude any influence
Karen might otherwise have on the decision-making process.
Karen's decision could never be certain, of course, as long as she
remained incompetent. Someone she loved and trusted, however, who
relied on Karen's values, would stand a better chance of arriving at a
decision that more closely resembled Karen's own than that of the court.
In sum, Quinlan suggests that when a court is satisfied that a trustwor-
85. See infra text at pp. 36-39 (interests/values distinction).
86. The New Jersey high court accepted the trustworthiness of Mr. Quinlan as an inti-
mate of Karen's:
The trial court was apparently convinced of the high character of Joseph Quinlan
and his general suitability as guardian under other circumstances, describing him as
'very sincere, moral, ethical and religious.' . . . [W]e sense from the whole record
before us that while Mr. Quinlan feels a natural grief, and understandably sorrows
because of the tragedy which has befallen his daughter, his strength of purpose and
character far outweighs these sentiments and qualifies him eminently for guardian-
ship of the person as well as the property of his daughter.
Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 670-71.
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thy87 intimate of the incompetent is available to utilize the patient's val-
ues in constructing a treatment decision, the patient's privacy right
requires that the court avoid affirmatively exercising its parens patriae
duty and withdraw from the decision-making process.
2.' The Right to Privacy and Self Determination
Quinlan states that the right to privacy "encompass[es] a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances
... ."88 Although this language suggests that the boundaries of the right
to privacy and the right of self determination are coterminous, in fact the
right to privacy recognized in Quinlan is broader than the right of self
determination in two respects. First, the right of self determination as-
sumes that the patient alone is competent to exercise the right either
while competent or through having clearly expressed a preference while
competent. 89 Second, a surrogate decision-maker properly exercises sub-
stitute judgment to enforce the patient's right of self determination only
when she knows the patient's actual preference. 90
As previously discussed, the right of self determination assumes that
the cognitive abilities of the sef are intact at the time the determination is
made.91 If an incompetent patient has not previously expressed a compe-
tent opinion on the treatment issue, the right of self determination fails to
control the facts at hand and the court assumes its parens patriae duty.
In this scenario, the court resorts to a "best interest" test to protect the
patient.92 In Quinlan, the court invoked the privacy right to enable
Karen to influence the treatment decision through her father's intimacy
with her values and perceptions. Karen's influence on the decision thus
survived her incompetency despite the fact that she had not clearly ex-
pressed her thoughts on the subject while competent.93 In this respect,
Karen's privacy right offered her more protection from judicial involve-
ment in the decision-making process than would her common law right
of self determination.
In discussing United States Supreme Court decisions affirming the
right to privacy, the Quinlan court also cited cases in which the privacy
right was related to certain interpersonal as well as personal choices, in-
87. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
88. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231. See also supra notes 20-32.
89. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 468 A.2d at 1231
90. See supra notes 20-32, 49-51 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
92. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
93. In introducing the privacy right into its analysis, the court discussed Supreme Court
decisions relating to the use of contraceptives by married and single persons as well as a wo-
man's right to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
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cluding intimate marital and family-related decisions.9 4 Citing Roe v.
Wade, the court observed: "[T]his right is broad enough to encompass a
patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circum-
stances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions. 95
The court alluded to the right of self determination but did not rely on it
to provide Karen with the level of protection she needed, turning instead
to her right to privacy. Moreover, in implying that Karen's right to pri-
vacy outweighed her need for possible protection from her father, the
court enlarged the applicability of the substitute judgment rule, implicitly
acknowledging a substantial identity of interests between Karen and her
father on the limited point of determining the course of treatment. 96
C. Policy Implications of Quinlan
In Quinlan, the court was more concerned with crafting an equitable
remedy in the face of particular, tragic facts than with fashioning policy
based on recognized holdings and facts that could be readily genera-
lized.97 Yet despite its loose reasoning, the decision has far reaching im-
plications. The court's invocation of Karen's privacy right profoundly
affected the roles of the judiciary, patient, and surrogate in cases of dying
incompetents.
The court effectively limited its role to deferring to the trustworthy
surrogate's judgment regarding the patient's wishes on the treatment
question. The surrogate assumed the responsibility, however, of acting in
conformity with the patient's values rather than according to the surro-
gate's perception of the patient's best interests. If the court had believed
94. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39-40, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153).
95. The court stated:
We have no doubt ... that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval
(not altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return)
and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discon-
tinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death.
Ad at 41, 355 A.2d at 663. The court then explored the constitutional right to privacy, noted
Karen's "extremely poor" prognosis, and concluded that Karen's choice, if she were compe-
tent to make it, would be vindicated by the law. The court then stated:
Our affirmation of Karen's independent right of choice... would ordinarily be based
upon her competency to assert it. The sad truth, however, is that she is grossly
incompetent and we cannot discern her supposed choice based on the testimony of
her previous conversations with friends, when such testimony is without sufficient
probative weight.... Nevertheless we have concluded that Karen's right of privacy
may be asserted on her behalf by her guardian under the peculiar circumstances here
present.
Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (citations ommitted).
96. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
97. Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653. The court did address policy questions surrounding physi-
cians' potential liability in determining the medical conditions which justify withdrawing treat-
ment. Id. at 48-50, 355 A.2d at 668-69. Such medical policy questions are separate from the
constitutional question of the patient's right to control her medical treatment.
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that the surrogate would not decide according to the patient's values, it
would not have considered the surrogate trustworthy.9
8
Only a privacy right analysis can effectively clarify the crucial dis-
tinction between values and interests in the predicament of the patient
who has expressed no clear preference. While the two concepts are
closely related, values, unlike interests, are inherently personal. Values
reveal a person's distinctively individual features. When the law permits
them to control conduct, as in the right of self determination, values de-
fine individual privacy by determining the extent and weight of an inter-
est in the context of other interests and particular circumstances. In
establishing priorities among possible courses of conduct, an individual
relies on her values to abandon or subordinate one interest in order not to
injure another, more important interest. As features of one's individual-
ity, values are inherently matters of fact, not law. Interests, however, as
features of legal relationships, are defined by law.99
For example, in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital," John
Brophy's statement that survival by reliance on artificial life support "is
not living"' 01 expressed both a value and an interest. The right of self
determination establishes as a matter of law a patient's interest in re-
jecting unwanted physical contact. Brophy's statement is significant be-
cause it clarifies his personal value judgment that this interest outweighs
another legally established interest-that of preserving his life. In com-
parison, a neighboring, alert cancer patient, for example, might disdain
the discomforts of chemotherapy. Like Brophy, she has an interest in
rejecting treatment. Under her values and different medical circum-
stances, however, she might choose to subordinate that interest to her
interest in prolonging her life.
A surrogate deciding for an incompetent, dying patient faces the di-
lemma of having to balance two squarely opposed interests of the patient:
his interest in remaining alive and his interest in freeing himself of argua-
bly useless medical intervention. Which interest is "best" for the patient
should be determined by the patient's values. A privacy right analysis
suggests that the surrogate's role is to weigh these and any other rele-
vant, competing interests according to the patient's wishes, while the
court's role is to facilitate the decision-making process without pre-empt-
ing the patient's values with "objective" legal interests. Even when apply-
ing a subjective "best interests" test, courts should abandon the
98. See supra note 86. The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically rejected the trial
court's view "that the obligation to concur in the medical care and treatment of his daughter
... would distort [Mr. Quinlan's] 'decision-making processes.'" Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 671.
99. "Interest" is "[tihe most general term that can be employed to denote a right, claim,
title, or legal share in something.... More particularly it means a right to have the advantage
accruing from anything ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) 729.
100. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986). See supra note 29.
101. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 417, 497 N.E.2d at 632 n.22.
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paternalistic "best interest" terminology in favor of a "patient values
test," which explicitly acknowleges the patient's right to privacy.
The Quinlan court's suggestion that the judiciary should recognize
the incompetent patient's privacy right augments the protections avail-
able under the right of self determination and improves upon the best
interest test. While the right of self determination effectively ends with
the absence of a patient's clearly expressed preference, the privacy right
protects the patient who has not expressed a preference. Through the
surrogate, the patient's values acquire the vitality to control the treat-
ment decision. The privacy right also provides protection unavailable
under the "objective" best interest test °2 by de-emphasizing the eviden-
tiary dilemma presented by the patient with "no expressed prefer-
ence."10 3 By invoking Karen's right to privacy,"° Quinlan gave priority
to the constitutional surrogation method that most closely assures access
to the patient's values and preserves at least some patient influence on the
treatment decision.10 5
Nine years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court retreated from this
bold decision, de-emphasizing the privacy right and stressing the right of
self determination and parens patriae doctrines. In In re Conroy 06 the
court held that it had earlier erred in Quinlan by excluding weak evi-
102. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
See infra notes 143-157 and accompanying text.
103. If courts redefined the "best interest" test to equate a patient's "interests" with her
values, ascertained by a trustworthy surrogate, an accommodation of patient values would
occur. However, the term "best interest test" would then be a misnomer. See supra text accom-
panying note 137.
104. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232, for a discussion of the types of
evidence useful in the view of the New Jersey Supreme Court in determining whether an in-
competent patient has left a clearly expressed preference on the treatment question. See infra
note 112 and accompanying text.
105. The policy behind the right of self determination accords a patient control over the
decision to reject or receive treatment. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229 ("[B]oth
aspects of the patient's right to bodily integrity-the right to consent to medical intervention
and the right to refuse it-should be respected."). By highlighting the patient's values, tenden-
cies to divert the decision-making criteria from what the patient would want to what a court,
physician, or relative considers "best" should be largely averted. See infra note 162.
106. The Quinlan decision has been criticized for not suggesting how its use of the right to
privacy would equally safeguard a patient's right to remain alive when treatment is not useless.
See GRISEZ & BOYLE, supra note 4 at 285. ("Since the rights to receive as well as to refuse
treatment are not given equal attention, the court's decision creates a danger that the equal
protection of the law of homicide will be denied to the noncompetent, who will be killed by
malevolent denial of due care.").
It has also been argued that an incompetent patient's right to privacy is infringed when a
guardian is allowed to make personal medical decisions on the patient's behalf. Smith, In re
Quinlan: Defining the Basis for Terminating Life Support Under the Right of Privacy, 12 TULSA
L. J. 150, 161 (1976). This view, however, fails to account for the fact that neglecting to
terminate treatment when such a step is medically indicated and in accord with the patient's
values would more seriously infringe the patient's right to privacy, since the silence of incom-
petence cannot denote consent to treatment.
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dence regarding Karen's views on the treatment question. 10 7 This posi-
tion was consistent with Conroy's overall approach of rigidly enforcing
"best interest" criteria when a patient's preference was unclear while ex-
panding relevancy standards to admit as much evidence as possible re-
garding a patient's preference. 108
"Though couched in constitutional terms of the right to privacy,"
the Conroy court asserted, "the underlying concept [in Quinlan] was an
individual's right to behave ... as he deems fit, provided that such behav-
ior ... [does] not conflict with the precepts of society."' 0 9 The court
then asserted that Quinlan required a "showing sufficient to demonstrate
[Karen's wishes].""' It offered five factors to guide the lower courts in
their evaluation of the probative value of wide ranging evidence: (1) re-
moteness of the statements or actions, (2) their consistency, (3) thought-
fulness, (4) specificity, and (5) the maturity of the person at the time of
the statements or acts.111
Under this test, Karen Quinlan's conversations, of little probative
value in the view of the trial court, 12 would fail all but the "consistency"
test. An application of the Conroy rationale to the Quinlan facts would
thus have required the court to deny Mr. Quinlan's petition.
The Conroy court also asserted that Quinlan authorized the guard-
ian to "express [Karen's] intent ... provided that the decision that she
would have made was also objectively reasonable.""' It is unclear
whether the Conroy court believed Quinlan intended to place limits on
the decision Karen might have made. Clearly the Quinlan emphasis on
Karen's privacy right suggests otherwise. Conroy noted that Quinlan in-
corporated an objective constraint on the guardian's assessment of
Karen's subjective considerations when it stated that a decision to with-
hold life support "should be accepted by a society the overwhelming ma-
jority of whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances,
exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest
to them.""I 4 In effect, Conroy suggested--clearly consistently with Quin-
lan-that Karen's incompetency terminated a portion of her rights to
privacy and self determination: her right to choose an alternative treat-
ment was objectively viewed as unreasonable.
Thus the Conroy court, in its treatment of Quinlan and its emphasis
on "objective" best interests tests for patients with "no expressed prefer-
107. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
108. 98 N.J. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
109. Id. at 362, 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1230-31.
110. Id. at 358, 486 A.2d at 1228.
111. Id.
112. 98 N.J. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
113. See supra note 74.
114. 98 N.J. at 358, 486 A.2d at 1228 (emphasis added).
Spring 19881
502 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 15:479
ence,"' 15 re-opened the following questions to which the Quinlan court
had already provided enlightened answers:
1. If the court's parens patriae duty runs to the patient, and the
interest of the patient in asserting her own values can best be pro-
tected by deferring to the judgment of a trusted intimate of the
patient, should the court employ its own best interest test? Can the
court alone effectively weigh the patient's privately defined "best
interest"?
2. Should the court defer to a state's interest in controlling such
treatment decisions despite an outcome likely to be different from
the patient's preference, as indicated by trustworthy intimates of
the patient?
3. Does a patient effectively forfeit her privacy right by virtue of
her failure to leave a clear expression of her intent on the with-
drawal of treatment question?
III. Application of the Privacy Right Rationale
Two recent cases highlight the courts' struggles to define their role
in surrogate decision-making for patients who have expressed no clear
preference regarding treatment. Judicial adoption of a privacy right the-
ory would clarify the nature and scope of the court's duty in this context.
A. In re Guardianship of Grant116
Barbara Grant was a twenty-two-year old victim of Batten's disease,
a degenerative and incurable neurological disorder."1 7 Judith Grant, her
mother and legal guardian, petitioned the court for authority to discon-
tinue Barbara's life support systems."" At the time of the hearing, Bar-
bara's intellectual and cognitive functions had virtually disappeared.119
Although Barbara had not "explicitly expressed her desires regarding the
use of life sustaining medical treatment," 120 her mother "believe[d] [Bar-
bara] would not want such treatment. 21 Barbara's immediate family
and her guardian ad litem, appointed in addition to her mother, con-
curred. 122 Only a separate "attorney for Barbara Grant," specially ap-
pointed by the trial court, opposed the motion to forego life support. 23
The trial court heard testimony offered by Barbara's mother and priest.
Based on Barbara's behavior and general value statements concerning
her death and religious beliefs, this testimony indicated that Barbara, if
115. Id. at 358, 486 A.2d at 1228 (quoting Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 647).
116. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
117. 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
118. Id. at 547, 747 P.2d at 446.
119. Id., 747 P.2d at 446.
120. Id. at 549, 747 P.2d at 447.
121. Id. at 550, 747 P.2d at 448.
122. Id., 747 P.2d at 448.
123. Id. at 551, 747 P.2d at 448.
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competent, would have chosen to forego life support. 12 4 The trial court
nonetheless denied the petition, concluding that Barbara's mother had no
power to decide the treatment question. Acting in violation of Barbara's
likely preference, the court held that it would authorize withdrawal of
treatment only if it could make a "substituted judgment" that Barbara, if
competent, would choose to refuse life support. 125
The Washington Supreme Court reversed, 126 stating that the trial
court's choice was itself a "decision by default."' 27 Reasoning that "the
incompetent's right to refuse treatment should be equal to a competent's
right to do so, ' 28 the high court observed that this right "stems from
both the constitutional right of privacy and the common law right to be
free of bodily invasion."' 12 9 As in Quinlan, the court in Grant declared
the relevance of the privacy right without explaining how the patient's
privacy interest related to the choice of treatment alternatives. 30 The
court's analysis also failed to provide a rationale linking the patient's
right to refuse treatment under the common law doctrine of self determi-
nation to the patient's constitutional right to privacy. The court held
that prior court authorization would not necessarily be required and that
"these [treatment] decisions are best left, wherever possible, to the in-
competent patient's guardian, immediate family and physicians."' 3 1 The
court concluded, "[T]he guardian's familiarity with the incompetent pa-
tient's character and personality, general attitude towards medical treat-
ment, and prior statements would assist [the guardian] in making this
judgment."' 32 Significantly, the court did not explicitly require a guard-
ian to comply with even a patient's clearly expressed preference,
although the patient's wishes "must be given strong consideration, even
if [expressed] while the patient was incompetent."'' 33
124. Id. at 565, 747 P.2d at 456.
125. Id. at 550, 747 P.2d at 448.
126. Id. at 547, 747 P.2d at 446. Four justices concurred with Justice Callow in his major-
ity opinion. Justices Andersen and Brachtenbach concurred in part; Justice Goodloe, joined
by Justice Dore, dissented.
127. Id. at 558, 747 P.2d at 452.
128. Id. at 552, 747 P.2d at 449 (citing In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 124, 660 P.2d 738
(1983)).
129. Id. at 553, 747 P.2d at 449.
130. Again quoting Colyer, the court stated: "The decision by the incurably ill to forego
medical treatment and allow the natural processes of death to follow their inevitable course is
so manifestly a 'fundamental' decision in their lives, that it is virtually inconceivable that the
right of privacy would not apply to it." Id. at 553, 747 P.2d 449 (quoting Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
at 120, 660 P.2d 738) (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 566, 747 P.2d at 456.
132. Id. at 567, 747 P.2d at 457.
133. Id., 747 P.2d at 457. The court's precise meaning on this point is not clear. The court
places heavy emphasis on the privacy right, and indicates, immediately after this "strong con-
sideration" language, that a patient-centered best interests determination is necessary "where
it cannot be ascertained what choice the patient would make if competent." Id., 747 P.2d at
457. This language suggests that "strong consideration" should be read to signify "controlling
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Under Grant, when the surrogate cannot ascertain the patient's
choice, she must decide according to the patient's best interests.1 3 4 The
court proposed a "nonexclusive list" of factors for the surrogate to con-
sider: the patient's physical, sensory, emotional, and cognitive function-
ing, her pain and other medical circumstances, and the "degree of
humiliation, dependence and loss of dignity probably resulting from the
condition and treatment." 1
35
One dissenter attacked the majority's view as being "in direct con-
flict with this court's duty to preserve life."' 36 He argued that Washing-
ton State's Natural Death Act indicated the legislature's intent that life
support may be ended only in those cases where competent adults make
this decision for themselves; he felt that the right to life was too personal
to be exercised by a surrogate. 37
Although purporting to advance the privacy interests of patients like
Barbara Grant, the Washington Supreme Court's analysis was severely
flawed. The court undermined its assertion that a patient's desires prop-
erly control the treatment decision with its vigorous insistence that the
patient's family be protected from the consequences of a patient's sur-
vival, and its statement that a patient's surrogate decision-maker should
give "strong"-but by implication not necessarily controlling-weight to
the patient's clearly expressed preference. 38
Moreover, the court did not require the guardian to evaluate the
factors for and against life support from the perspective of the patient.
Without distinguishing the patient's values from her interests,1 39 the
court's best interest test permits the surrogate to base his judgment on
either his own or the patient's values. Since the surrogate can inject his
own personal values, the dissent is correct in observing that the court's
consideration". However, the court also states: "The prolongation of the existence of this
vegetative state for possibly years to come by artificially placing liquids and nutrients into this
body to the emotional and economic destruction of the survivors is a monstrous assault to the
family concerned that we will not countenance." Id. at 565, P.2d at 455. The latter strongly
worded view clearly suggests that the patient's possible preference to continue treatment, even
if deserving protection under the privacy right, should not receive controlling consideration in
the surrogate's decision-making. Thus the court's "strong consideration" language may be an
adroit word choice making the privacy right operable in one direction only-enabling the
patient's choice to end life support to control the surrogate's decision, while freeing the surro-
gate to diregard the patient's views and privacy right should the patient prefer to impose on his
family the "monstrous assault" of surviving. Of course, a court decision permitting the latter
"one-way" use of the privacy right would appear to violate the Equal Protection Clause. U.S.
Const. Amend. XIV.
134. Id., 747 P.2d at 457.
135. Id. at 568, 747 P.2d at 457 (quoting Conroy, 98 N.J. at 397, 486 A.2d 1209 (Handler,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
136. Id. at 575, 747 P.2d at 460 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
137. Id., 747 P.2d at 461 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
138. See supra note 133.
139. See supra text pp. [36-39].
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decision-making formula would allow a guardian effectively to disregard
the patient's privacy right and implicitly to measure the value of the pa-
tient's remaining life as "negligible."'"
In addition, the majority apparently interpreted its duty to protect
the incompetent as requiring physicians to discontinue Barbara's life sup-
port. 141 The court thus implicitly based its own duty to protect the pa-
tient on the guardian's determination of the patient's bests interests.
Here the court obviously confuses the roles of surrogate and court. In
presenting an overbroad and inadequately explained interpretation of its
own duty under the parens patriae doctrine and of the patient's rights of
self determination and privacy, the majority allowed the court's responsi-
bility asparenspatriae to disappear in an excessive deference to surrogate
decision-makers.
Finally, the dissent's criticism proceeds from a premise that is insen-
sitive to the patient's right to privacy. In the dissent's view, Barbara's
right to life imposed on the court a duty to presume she would want to
continue treatment. This view of the court's obligation, like that of the
trial court, suggests that a public policy in favor of life controls the treat-
ment issue even where the patient's own wishes, though not explicitly in
favor of ending life support, strongly suggest such a preference. To the
dissent, inadequate evidence regarding the patient's preference automati-
cally triggers a public rather than a private determination, a conclusion
dictated by law rather than a patient-influenced question of fact.
In re Guardianship of Grant makes clear that conflicting interpreta-
tions of the rights of self determination and privacy and the parens pa-
triae duty lead to divergent and irreconcilable results. These doctrines
can be integrated to serve the paramount concern of the law in this
area-that of promoting patient influence over the treatment deci-
sion' 42---only through a privacy right rationale.
To apply a privacy right rationale to the facts in Grant, the court
would first need to determine whether Mrs. Grant were trustworthy and
reliable to act as Barbara's surrogate. If she were approved, the court
would then instruct her to familiarize herself thoroughly with the nature
of Barbara's illness, degree of functioning, and earlier expressions of per-
spectives and values that might be relevant to her present circumstances.
Third, the court would advise Mrs. Grant that her daughter enjoys a
constitutional right to control the treatment decision and that Mrs.
140. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 579, 747 P.2d at 463 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
141. Having determined that the patient had the right to have life-sustaining treatment
withheld, id. at 556, 747 P.2d at 451, the majority observed that "the trial court's resolution of
this matter [by denying the petition to end life support] would effectively deny Barbara Grant
the right to withhold life sustaining procedures altogether." Id. at 558, 747 P.2d at 452.
142. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 ("[T]he goal of decision-
making for incompetent patients should be to determine and effectuate, insofar as possible, the
decision that the patient would have made if competent.").
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Grant's or other third persons' values and interests must not enter into
that decision. Fourth, the court would obtain the guardian's oath that
she would construct a decision for Barbara according to Barbara's val-
ues, consistent with the court's procedural instructions. If necessary, the
court would adjudicate any disputes between other third parties and the
guardian concerning Mrs. Grant's qualifications or performance of her
duties. Finally, the court would declare the guardian immune from civil
or criminal liability for her compliance with these procedures provided
she acts in good faith.
B. Barber v. Superior Court
In Barber v. Superior Court,'43 the California Court of Appeals dis-
missed murder charges against two physicians who had withdrawn life
support from Clarence Herbert, a brain-damaged incompetent facing "an
indefinite vegetative existence." 1" The doctors had acted in response to
a request by the patient's wife and other family members. t 45The court
found that the doctors were not under an affirmative duty artificially to
prolong Mr. Herbert's life146 and held that "the patient's own desires and
feelings,"' 47 as expressed before the onset of incompetency, should guide
the treatment decision. If the Court could not ascertain the patient's
preference, it would apply the best interest test described in the Presi-
dent's Commission Report:148
Under this standard, such factors as the relief of suffering, the pres-
ervation or restoration of functioning and the quality as well as the
extent of life may be considered. Finally, since most people are
concerned about the well being of their loved ones, the surrogate
may take into account the impact of the decision on those people
closest to the patient. 149
The court observed that "[tlhere was evidence" that Mr. Herbert had
expressed a desire to discontinue life support systems in the event of irre-
versible incompetency' and concluded that his wife "was the proper
person to act as a surrogate for the patient with the authority to decide
issues regarding further treatment."15' The court observed:
[Herbert's] wife and children were the most obviously appropriate
surrogates in this case. They were the people who would be most
affected by the decision and were in the best position to know Mr.
Herbert's own feelings and desire. In addition, there was clear evi-
143. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
144. Id. at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487-88. See supra note 72
145. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
146. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94.
147. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
148. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 3, at 134-35.
149. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
150. Id. The court did not, however, discuss standards of evidence.
151. Id.
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dence that they were concerned for his comfort and welfare and
some or all of them were present at the hospital nearly around the
clock. 152
The court also* found no evidence that the family members were "moti-
vated in their decision by anything other than love and concern for the
dignity of their husband and father."1 3
The test described in Barber stands in sharp contrast to the best
interest tests proposed by Conroy.'54 Barber clearly discourages judicial
surrogation by assigning authority to a trustworthy surrogate intimate
with the patient. The court's language in formulating its test includes
subtle, qualitative elements that avoid precisely limiting the list of factors
the surrogate could consider. The surrogate's effective control over the
decision and the absence of a clear and convincing standard of evidence
of the patient's expressions makes judicial authority over the process vir-
tually impossible. Moreover, Barber does not require the surrogate to
apply for judicial approval prior to the termination of treatment,: 55 fur-
ther vitiating judicial control over the decision-making process.
Since the court found "some evidence" of Mr. Herbert's preference,
it is not certain that the court would advocate minimal judicial involve-
ment when evidence of the patient's preference were weak or nonexis-
tent.1 56 Its language, however, suggests a clear intention to use the test
to assist the surrogate in making a decision consistent with the choice the
patient would have made.' 57
Barber suggests that a court must first determine the trustworthiness
152. Id. at 1021 n.2, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493 n. 2.
153. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
154. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
155. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
156. It is also not immediately clear from the Barber opinion whether additional or
stronger evidence of the patient's preference would increase or decrease the need for judicial
involvement. If Barber represents a policy of giving preference to an intimate surrogate's judg-
ment over that of a judge, additional evidence would increase the likelihood that the trustwor-
thy surrogate would make an appropriate choice, thereby decreasing the need for judicial
supervision. If, however, Barber represents a policy preferring judicial oversight of an intimate
surrogate's judgment where evidence is strong, more reliable indications of patient preference
would trigger greater judicial supervision to ensure that these indications of the patient's likely
preference are not disregarded as the surrogate constructs a decision.
Two features of the Barber decision suggest that the first of these policy views best charac-
terizes the court's position. First, the Barber court simply did not address the question of
evidence standards, suggesting a basic confidence in the surrogate's ability and willingness to
weigh evidence responsibly. Second, the court did not find that a surrogate's right to decide
the treatment question without judicial approval hinged on any particularly high or low
threshold of reliable evidence, suggesting again that the court believed the patient's interests
would be protected even without judicial supervision. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 493. "
157. This interpretation is also supported by the court's desire to appoint a surrogate who
was "in the best position to know Mr. Herbert's own feelings and desire." Id. See also supra
text accompanying note 151.
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of the proposed surrogate.158 If the court found the surrogate trustwor-
thy, it could expect her to apply the best interest test without need for
judicial oversight. As a practical matter, the Barber test appears to pre-
sume that the surrogate is reliable. The "best interest test" proposed by
Barber thus represents judicial circumlocution for deference to the judg-
ment of the patient's private representative. While this may honor the
patient's privacy right when this representative/surrogate is trustworthy
and reliable, the Barber opinion provides little guidance to the surrogate
in key areas. The court should instruct the surrogate to clarify that the
patient's privacy right requires that the surrogate fulfill specific responsi-
bilities.'" 9 For example, the surrogate should be thorough in collecting
information regarding the patient's condition, prognosis and expressions
of value judgments, including those which may have been expressed to
others besides the surrogate. The court's parenspatriae duty should obli-
gate the court to provide such legal direction to the surrogate to protect
the proper exercise of the patient's privacy right. With the court's duties
fulfilled, the Barber test would lead to a similar result as occurred in
Quinlan: a private surrogate decision-maker, intimate with the patient,
unguided by the patient's explicit preference but familiar with the pa-
tient's values, obtains judicial authorization to resolve the treatment
question.'60
C. A Privacy Right Rationale
Summarizing the analysis above, this Note suggests the following
privacy right rationale as a model for deciding whether life support
should be withheld from dying incompetents who have loved ones at
hand capable of serving as surrogate decision-makers and who have not
expressed a clear preference on this subject.
A. The right to privacy should apply where patients who have
expressed no clear preference have surrogate decision-makers at
hand who are intimate with the patient's values.
1. The decision concerning life support is fundamental
and personal to the dying patient.
2. The common law right of self determination allows
dying patients to decide to continue or end treatment. The pa-
158. This duty would arise from the court's obligation under theparenspatriae doctrine to
act to protect the interests of the helpless patient. See supra notes 10, 33-34 and accompanying
text. The Barber opinion presents a relatively cursory treatment of the court's duties relative to
the surrogation process. Id. at 1021-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. It should be noted that the
issue before the court in Barber did not directly implicate the court's parens patriae duty to
protect the interests of a helpless patient. The court was called upon to decide the propriety of
murder charges brought against the patient's physicians. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
159. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
160. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; see infra notes 71-106 and accompanying text.
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tient is normally unaccountable to the state or to third parties
for her decision.
3. When a patient succumbs to irreversible incompetency
without having earlier expressed a preference on the life sup-
port question, she cannot directly control the decision, and a
decision must be made for her.
4. The patient's right to decide implies the patient's right
to control or at least influence the decision made by a
surrogate.
5. Where the dying incompetent's intimate values are
known to a surrogate, the surrogate may infer the patient's de-
cision by applying the patient's values to all the medical and
nonmedical facts relevant to the patient's decision.
6. The common law right of self determination presumes
that the patient competently formulates decisions concerning
her physical status; thus, it does not reach patients whose pref-
erences must be determined indirectly.
7. Therefore, the right to privacy, exercised by a respon-
sible surrogate, should be available to the dying incompetent to
further the goal of the patient's autonomy where irreversible
incompetence and the lack of a clearly expressed preference
make the right of self determination inapplicable.
B. The court can protect the patient's right to privacy and
fulfill its parenspatriae duty by limiting its involvement in the surro-
gation process to determining the reliability of the surrogate and
properly instructing the surrogate to promote the fullest possible ex-
ercise of the patient's privacy right.
1. The court has a duty under theparenspatriae doctrine
to protect the rights of the helpless patient.
2. In this context, the court can best protect the patient's
interests by promoting the exercise of the patient's privacy
right, which orders the priority of a patient's interests accord-
ing to the patient's values.
3. The court can best promote the exercise of the pa-
tient's privacy right by requiring a decision-making process
most likely to produce the result the patient herself would
reach.
4. To fulfill the court's duty under B (1), (2) and (3), the
court must authorize the surrogation process that most closely
resembles the patient's own decision-making process.
5. A patient's decision-making process would rely heav-
ily on uniquely personal perceptions, e:x:periences and values.
The interrelations of these individual elements in a decision-
making process, if presented to a court, would at best present a
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series of nonjusticiable, conclusory assertions of priorities
among legal interests, producing a nonjusticiable result. Hence
there can be no meaningful judicial oversight of the patient's
decision-making process, only of its procedures and results.
6. A surrogate sensitive to the patient and properly in-
structed to consider the patient's perceptions and values as the
sole criteria in resolving the treatment dilemma may construct
a decision inferentially as indicated in A (5). Such decision-
making by a reliable private surrogate will more likely arrive at
the decision the patient would have made than will a decision-
making process in which the court applies "objective" criteria
or seeks to perform itself the process described in B (5).
7. Because of the nonjusticiable character of the process
described in B (5), and because "objective" criteria fail to con-
sider properly the patient's values, judicial surrogation in this
context would constitute unconstitutional state interference
with the patient's privacy right, unless the patient has no quali-
fied intimate to serve as surrogate. Only in the latter case is
judicial surrogate decision-making proper, on the basis that
there is no other party capable of asserting the patient's rights,
and the court's parens patriae duty therefore requires affirma-
tive judicial involvement. Wherever possible, however, the
court should avoid entering the private world of the patient's
confrontation with death and her decision regarding arguably
useless treatment.
8. When the court has determined that a responsible sur-
rogate exists, it should facilitate the private surrogation process
described in B (6) in order to advance properly the interests of
the incompetent patient as secured through the exercise of the
patient's right to privacy. The court should limit its role to the
following:
a. determining the reliability and trustworthiness of
the surrogate;
b. advising the surrogate of his role, including the
specific duty to employ as criteria in reaching a treatment
decision only the values of the patient;
c. prescribing for the surrogate specific tasks gener-
ally supportive of the surrogation process. These tasks
would include medical consultation and any other infor-
mation-gathering necessary to enable the surrogate to be-
come fully informed of the specific circumstances facing
the patient and of the patient's probable preferences under
such circumstances;
d. securing the surrogate's oath to comply with the
court's instructions;
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e. adjudicating disputes concerning either the surro-
gate's trustworthiness or actual performance of his duties;
f. protecting surrogate decision makers from crimi-
nal or civil liability when the surrogate has acted properly
under these procedures.
Conclusion
In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court invoked the right to
privacy to provide a helpful remedy for dying incompetents who leave no
clear expression regarding preference on the treatment question but who
are supported by trustworthy intimates. Quinlan validates a patient cen-
tered, values based surrogation where both the right of self determination
and a court formulated "objective" best interests test cannot assure pa-
tient influence on the treatment decision.161 Expanding on Quinlan, a
161. Some commentators object to private decision-making as creating a "right to kill,"
since private persons might determine that another's life should end. NOWAK, ROTUNDA &
YOUNG, supra note 16, at 720-21. This objection first relies on a controversial notion: that a
homicidal act occurs where arguably useless medical treatment is ended. Courts generally
have rejected this view of termination of treatment decisions on the theory that the disease, not
the withdrawal of treatment, is the cause of death, and the patient would not be committing
suicide by exercising her right to end treatment. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350-51, 486 A.2d
at 1224 ("Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course; if
death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and
not the result of a self-inflicted injury."). See also In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 123, 660 P.2d
738, 743 (1983) ("A death which occurs after the removal of life sustaining systems is from
natural causes, neither set in motion nor intended by the patient.").
A more serious defect in this "right to kill" argument, however, is that it proves too
much. Best interest tests such as those set forth in Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364-67, 486 A.2d at 1231-
32, do not absolutely prohibit withdrawal of life support. Foregoing" life support by court
order under either of these tests, according to the "right to kill" view would constitute a form
of state sanctioned "execution," similar to the alleged private party's "right to kill," since the
only differences between the private and public decision-maker-the identity of the decision-
maker and the standards controlling the decision-are irrelevant to the decision's effect on the
patient's right to life. The state would thus need to demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient
to warrant such a homicidal act against a vulnerable and innocent person. Since this clearly
would be impossible, absent an impermissible evaluation of the worth of the patient's life, there
could be no constitutionally valid best interest test, only an absolute prohibition against with-
drawing artificial life support under any circumstances where the patient has not expressed a
preference to end treatment. Thus the noncommunicative or undecided patient--even in cases
of terrible suffering where the Conroy pure-objective test would allow ending life support-
would be required to continue life indefinitely, however severe her pain or protracted her mis-
ery, and regardless of the clear fact that no recovery could be expected.
The value of the "right to kill" objection lies in its appropriate moral warnings in two
areas. First, the patient's so-called "right to die" does not abridge the laws against suicide or
euthanasia, hence it does not imply a "right to kill" on the part of the surrogate. See GRISEZ
& BOYLE, supra note 4, at 290-91. To permit a surrogate to terminate treatment because the
surrogate believes ending treatment is in the patient's best interest would circumvent the pa-
tient's right to privacy. Thus, in determining the trustworthiness and capability of an intimate
who petitions for surrogation rights, the court should find by clear and convincing evidence
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model privacy right theory would require the court to certify a proposed
surrogate as capable and trustworthy and to protect the patient's inter-
ests by imposing limited procedural safeguards on the surrogate.' 62
These safeguards would ensure that the surrogate has evaluated the pa-
tient's condition in the same manner as the patient herself might do. The
court should also require the surrogate to explore fully indications of the
patient's preference.
This approach would properly reassert the importance of the right
to privacy as espoused by Quinlan and would advance meaningfully hu-
mane public policy on behalf of persons rendered incompetent because of
age or illness. Where an individual has lost the opportunity to assert
personal control over her last moments, the law should permit her to
have the "right" person act in her place. Courts should endorse such
surrogate decision-making as an expression of the patient's constitutional
right to privacy. This approach also conforms to the common law goal of
promoting a patient's autonomy and is preferable to benignly motivated
but ultimately disrespectful and intrusive judicial control over a dying
patient's last decision.
By Gary Underwood Scharff*
that the petitioner has clearly distinguished his own values from those of the patient and has
sworn to decide the treatment question only according to the patient's values. While the
boundary between patient and surrogate values is clearly difficult to patrol, the court's exami-
nation of the petitioner and of evidence challenging the petitioner's suitability should normally
enable the court to determine whether the patient's privacy right will be respected.
A second moral lesson of the "right to kill" opponents relates to the delicate questions of
policy which these treatment dilemmas raise and the inherently fact-sensitive challenges which
cannot be resolved by rules of law. The impact of medical technology on the process of dying
compels realization of a uniquely urgent social responsibility: as a society we tread this
ground-the intensely private world of the death of another human being-not because we
have an inherent right to be there, but because we must take responsibility for a technical
power that could harm the vulnerable and helpless even more ruthlessly if we were to stay
away.
162. In Quinlan the New Jersey Supreme Court required Mr. Quinlan to consult with
Karen's attending physicians and a hospital ethics committee. 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
Conroy also discussed the procedural requirements imposed by statute in the event of possible
abuse of an elderly, institutionalized person. 98 N.J. at 378-88, 486 A.2d at 1239-44.
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